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The article explores constitutional issues underlying legislative jurisdiction in Canada in relation to the passage of a law
governing the transfer and holding ofsecurities and interests in securities. It argues for the existence ofprovincialjurisdiction
to legislate a comprehensive statute. Recognizing the imperative of uniform provincial legislation in the area, the article
urges the federal government to concede jurisdiction on those points in which it has para/let legislative power.
1. INTRODUCTION

On August 1, 2003, the Canadian Securities Administrators' Uniform Securities Transfer Act Task Force issued a
Consultation Paper entitled "Proposals for a Modernized Uniform Law in Canada Governing the Holding, Transfer
and Pledging of Securities", proposing a uniform provincial Securities Transfer Act (UST A). The Consultation Paper
*394 described UST A as "commercial property-transfer law governin g the transfer and holding ofsecurities and interest
in securities." 2
Canadian Securities Administrators' Uniform Securities Transfer Act Task Force Proposal for a Mode rnized Uniform Law in
Canada Governing the H olding, Transfer and Pledging ofSecurities Consultation Paper, August I, 2003 (UST A Consultation
Paper); online: <http:// www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/HotTopics/currentinfo/USTNusta consultation paper 20030801.pdf> (date
accessed: J anuary 30, 2004). The USTA Consultation Paper was r·eleased together with a Consultative Draft USTA and
Comments (Draft USTA), and proposed conforming amendments to Ontario and Alberta Personal Property Security Acts
and Business Corporations Acts, and tables of concordance online: <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/HotTopics/currentinfo/
USTNusta draft comments 20030801.pdf> (date accessed: January 30, 2004).

2

Ibid., at 5.

This article explores the constitutional issues underlying the legislative jurisdiction in Canada in relation to the passage
of such a law, which is designed to cover both the direct and indirect systems of securities holding. 3 Such legislation is
concerned with the contractual and property rights of investors in each system, and not with investors' rights and issuers'
obligations under regulatory law.
3

" Holding and " holder are loosely used here to respectively denote "owning and "owner in a broad sense, rather than
necessarily physicaJJy taking possession, which is anyway impossible in connection with the direct holding of uncertificated
securities and indirect holding.
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Briefly stated, in the direct holding system investors are the holders o f securities, each of which may be in either
certificated or uncertificated form. With regard to each such specific security, the investor has a property right and is
in a direct legal relationship with the security issuer . Conversely, in the indirect holding system, an investor does not
hold a security, does not have a property right in a specific security, and is not in a direct legal relationship with the
security issuer . R ather, an investor in the indirect holding system is the holder of a security entitlement, credited to a
securities account kept with a securities intermediary. A security entitlement consists of a bundle of rights against the
securities intermediary backed by financial assets 4 held by the intermediary. Financial assets held by the intermediary
may be either actual securities, or security entitlements ultimately backed by actual securities held by an upper-tier
intermediary. Generally speaking, the entitlement holder has a proprietary right in a pool of financial assets, but not
in any one particular asset among those of which the pool consists. Each holding system has thus a distinct subject
matter to be addressed by UST A. Accordingly, in connection with the direct holding system, UST A will *395 be dealing
with securities. At the same time, in connection with the indirect hold ing system, UST A will be concerned with security
entitlements.
4

See definitions of "security entitlement and "financial asset ins. 1(1) and s. 5 of the Draft USTA, and accompanying
Comments.

Existing legislation in Canada that governs securities transfers suffers from two serious drawbacks: 5
5

Critique along such lines may be traced back to Alberta Law Reform Institute, Transfers of Investment Securities, Report No.
67, June 1993 (Edmonton, Alta.), particularly chapters 6 and 8, respectively dealing with current Canadian law of securities
transfers and constitutional jurisdiction.

1. Particularly in relation to the indirect holding system, current law is fundamentally flawed and outdated. It does not
accommodate modern market practices and is inconsistent with emerging new international standards. Specifically, it is
not in harmony with the advanced legislation applicable in the United States, with which Canada has integrated financial
markets.

2. Current law stems from various sources and is quite segmented. The statutes that constitute it were passed under
different heads of legislative powers, with each statute covering only specific types of securities. Legislation is partly
federal and partly p rovincial. For example, the transfer of securities issued by a corporation is generally provided for
by the corporate statu te that governs that corporation. For a provincially incorporated corporation, this is usually the
provincia l business corporation Act governing the corporation. 6 For a federally incorporated corporation, other than a
regulated financia l institu tion, the governing statute is the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA). 7 For a federally
regulated financia l institution, applicable provisions are found in the relevant regulating federal statu te; depending on the
institution type, this is the statute governing banks, insurance companies, loan and trust companies, or cooperative *396
credit associations. 8 Also, confusion exists within federal legislation itself. For example, the transfer of securities in the
form of bills of exchange or p romissory notes issued by banks is governed by federa l legislation governing banks, while the
transfer of securities in the form of bills ofexchange or promissory notes issued by provincially incorporated corporations
is governed by federal legislation dealing with bills and notes.
internally consistent, and its application is not a lways certain.
6

9

Existing legislation is thus neither harmonious nor

An exception to this statement is the Business Corporations Act (Ontario), R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16 (OBCA). Unlike other modern
business corporation Acts in Canada, the OBCA's rules governing direct transfers of securities apply to any "body corporate,
and not merely corporations incorporated under the OBCA. See the definition of "issuer ins. 53(1) of the OBCA. See also the
expanded definition of "issuer ins. 85(8) of the OBCA for the limited purposes of the rules ins. 85 of the OBCA governing
the indirect holding and transfer of securities through the facilities of The CDS Limited (CDS Limited).
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7

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 44.

8

See Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46; Insurance Companies Act, S.C. 1991, c. 47; Trust and Loan Companies Act, S.C. 1991, c. 45;
and Cooperative Credit Associations Act, S.C. 1991, c. 48.

9

For banking federal legislation, see Section 4, Incorporation of Companies and Banking, below. Separate federal statutes
govern (i) direct transfers of bills of exchange and promissory not,es generally, and (ii) direct transfers of bills and notes
to CDS Limited specifically as well as indirect transfers of bills and notes among participants of CDS Limited effected by
book entries on the records of CDS Limited. See Sections 7, Jurisdiction in Relation to Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes Direct Holding, and 8, Jurisdiction in Relation to Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes Indirect Holding, below.
Where corporate legislation is provincial, federal law in relation to biJJs and notes will prevail under the doctrine of federal
paramountey discussed in Section 2, Constitutional Law: Background, below. See also Section 7, below. See also s. 53(2) of
the OBCA, which states: "This Part VI] does not apply to a promissory note or bill of exchange to which the Bills of Exchange
Act (Canada) applies. Whether the transfer of securities in the form of bills of exchange or promissory notes is governed by
federal legislation dealing with bills and notes or the CBCA is touched upon below in Section 7.

UST A is designed to address both drawbacks and thus to eliminate legal uncertainty as well as the lack of competitiveness
of Canadian financial markets that results from the present legal regime. An important aspect of the proposed reform is
the elimination of the confusing duplication and segmentation of the existing legislation, which can be achieved as long
as USTA is uniformly implemented by all provinces and territories in Canada. Moreover, this reform is to be carried
out by the replacement of existing legislation by one comprehensive, internally consistent statute covering all types of
securities and securities entitlements, so as to provide for a modern legal regime that will be harmonious with the one
in the United States. Stated otherwise, in modernizing the law by providing a proper framework to deal with security
entitlements (namely, the indirect holding system), USTA is designed to fill a void. *397 At the same time, in its allinclusive comprehensiveness, UST A will also rectify a problem stemming from perceptions regarding the division of
legislative powers in Canada. By addressing both drawbacks, USTA will substantially enhance both the efficiency and
integrity of Canadian financial markets.
This article suggests that the provinces can confidently legislate a comprehensive, all-inclusive USTA. The analysis
is premised on the observation that the current state of patchwork uncoordinated legislation is accidental and not
the product of any thoughtful or thought-through design. Stated otherwise, the present statutory scheme has never
been properly rationalized. Rather, it reflects a series of unrelated ad hoc decisions, each designed to provide for an
immediate solution to a single problem. Any thought given to possible side effects of any specific solution has been
partial and incomplete. No one has endeavoured to properly examine the resulting overall impact of the present confused
statutory scheme to the Canadian capital markets and market participants, and the possible inherent contradictions and
uncertainties in the totality of the treatment of the subject matter.
The position taken here is that provincial legislative power covers the entire area. On the points where it may be
superseded by a paramount federal legislative power, the federal government is urged to concede jurisdiction, so as to
allow for a uniform comprehensive provincial statute to provide far-reaching benefits. Such benefits will be undercut
by any overlapping or duplicating federal statute that inevitably will introduce harmful uncertainty. True, as will be
outlined below, federal jurisdiction covers some aspects of USTA, however, by no means can federal jurisdiction be
extended to cover the entire area; rather, it is limited to a few aspects or segments only. Accordingly, this article strongly
urges the federal government to withhold legislative powers with respect to such points so as to allow uniform provincial
jurisdiction over the entire area, thereby eliminating any variation in treatment or uncertainty as to which law applies.
Indeed, in the securities regulation area, the federal government has demonstrated its willingness to eliminate unnecessary
overlaps by withdrawing from areas well covered by provincial laws, and thereby enhance market efficiency. O A similar
approach is called for also in *398 relation to legislation governing the transfer and holding of securities and security
entitlements. In the final analysis, the proposed approach is premised on the provision for the entire area of a uniform
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comprehensive provincial statute, closely modelled on Article 8 of t he American Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
This approach will facilitate further harmonization with the legal position in the United States.
10

See An Act to Amend the Canada Business Corporations Act and the Canada Cooperatives Act and to Amend other Acts in
Consequence, S.C. 2001, c. 14. One stated purpose for the Bill was to do away with duplication, or "eliminate redundant
regulation or compliance costs in an area already regulated by provincial securities Jaws. This was implemented by the Bill in
the area of insider trading. See for e.g., s. 52(5) and s. 53 of the Bill, repealing s. 126(3) and (4) and ss. 127 129 of the Canada
Business Corporations Act, R .S.C. 1985, c. C 44, respectively.

11

For convenience, the phrase "transfer and holding is used generally in this article in the context of securities and security
entitlements even though, strictly speaking, security entitlements are not transferred. Although it is possible to transfer
an interest in a security entitlement (e.g., a security interest), most transactions in the indirect holding system involve the
extinguishment and creation of separate entitlements, not the transfer of the same security entitlement.

Two obvious limitations of the analysis are to be clarified: First, as indicated, UST A is designed to be a "commercial
property-transfer law governing the transfer and holding of securities and interest in securities." 2 As will be explored
further below, 3 this is to be distinguished from a regulatory law dealing with the distribution or trading of securities
and the operation of securities markets, namely, securities regulation. Hence, this article takes no position on the debate
as to jurisdiction over the latter subject. Second, the article does not discuss the substantive provisions proposed for
UST A; 4 that is, it is limited to a discussion on the power to legislate in the area, so that the particular legislative scheme
of UST A is outside the scope of the article.
12

See supra, n. 2.

13

See discussion in Section 4, Incorporation of Companies and Banking, infra.

14

For the substantive provisions, see accompanying article by E. Spin k & M. Pare, "The Uniform Securities Transfers Act:
Globalized Commercial Law for Canada (2004) 19 B.F.L.R. 321.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: BACKGROUND
The following premises on which the discussion rests should be stated at the outset:
*399 l . In Canada, the totality of legislative power is distributed between the federal Parliament and provincial
legislatures. 5 Legislative competence in any given area, either provincial or federal, must be based on a specific heading
indicated by the Constitution A ct, 1867. 6 The latter identifies classes and subjects exclusively assigned to federal
jurisdiction ins. 91 and to provincial jurisdiction ins. 92.
15

Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada (student ed.) (Toronto: Carswell, 2000) at 283 84, 392.

16

Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet. C. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.

2. The various headings oflegislative powers enumerated in the Constitution Act are not mutually exclusive; some overlap
was even contemplated, and anyway is not precluded. In relation to two legislative powers, one of which is federal and
the other provincial, the possibility for such an overlap has been known as the "double aspect" doctrine. Thereunder,
subjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall withins. 92, may for another purpose fall withins. 91. 7
17

H odge v. The Queen (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117 at 130, and in general, H ogg, supra, n. 15 at 361.
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3. The "double aspect" doctrine raises the possibility of inconsistency between a federal and provincial statute, whenever
each regulates the matter as an "aspect" of a legitimate source of legislative power. In such a case, under the "federal
paramountcy" doctrine, "where there are inconsistent (or conflicting) federal and provincial laws, it is the federal law
which prevails." 8
18

Hogg, supra, n. 15 at 398.

4. Inconsistency and conflict between federal and provincial laws is, however, not always easily determined, and is a
source of uncertainty and inefficiency. Accordingly, insofar as it enc roaches upon a field of competence belonging to
the other level of government, the "double aspect" doctrine is to be relied on by either the federal government or the
provinces with extreme caution and restraint. It is only when "the federal and provincial characteristics of a law are
roughly equal in importance" that it *400 can be concluded "that laws of that kind may be enacted by either the [federal]
Parliament or a [provincial] Legislature." 9
19

Hogg, ibid. , at 361 , relying on W.R . Lederman, Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981)
at 244, and citing case law adopting this approach.

5. By themselves, concern for the "the health and strength of the national economy" alongside "the national interest"
cannot serve as a stand-alone basis for legislation designed "to control risk in the financial system in Canada and promote
its efficiency and stability" 20 or, more generally, for federal jurisdfotion over the country-wide financial system. As
indicated, any federal legislative jurisdiction in Canada must rest on a specific class or subject enumerated in s. 9 1 of the
Constitution Act. At the most, both the concern for the health of the national economy and the national interest may guide
in the interpretation of specified legislative powers under the Constitution Act. But ultimately, as between a provincial
law whose provincial characteristics are based on a direct head of provincial power (e.g., property and civil rights) and
a federal law whose federal characteristics are based on a remote and indirect head of federal jurisdiction, neither the
federal Parliament's concern for the health and strength of the national economy nor its concern for the national interest
is sufficient to augment the law's federal characteristics, so as to make them roughly equal to provincial characteristics,
and thereby to supersede the provincial law. Stated otherwise, under such circumstances, the double aspect doctrine may
not be properly relied on to justify federal intervention.
20

See preamble to Payment Clearing and Settlement Act, S.C. 1996, c. 6, (PCSA), enacted as Schedule to An Act to Amend, Enact
and Repeal Certain Laws Relating to Financial Institutions, S.C. 1996, c. 6, s. 162. Needless to say, the discussion is concerned
here with the mere validity of such grounds to serve by themselves as a basis for federa l jurisdiction and not whether the PCSA
is otherwise constitutional.

The conclusion of the analysis that follows in this article is that transfer of both securities and security entitlements is a
matter of provincial jurisdiction under the legislative power relating to property and civil rights. The federal government
is urged to amend federal legislation so as to exclude securities that are bills of exchange or promissory notes. *401
In such a case, comprehensive uniform legislation could be introduced in Canada to govern securities holding and
transfers, in both the direct and indirect holding systems, exclusively on the provincial level. Of course, the successful
implementation of this proposal presupposes that the provinces and territories agree to uniformly enact such legislation
to a degree that has never before been achieved in the history of commercial law in Canada.
3. "PROPERTY AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE PROVINCE"

Both securities and security entitlements are forms of property. The holding and transfer of securities located in a
province is thus fundamentally a matter coming within "Property and Civil Rights in the Province." As such it falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the province, within which the securities are located under s. 92(13) of the Constitution
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Act, 1867. This applies to both the direct and indirect holding systems, and irrespective of who is the issuer of those
securities. As pointed out by H ogg, "[t]he creation of property rights, their transfer and their general characteristics are

within property and civil rights in the province." 2
21

Hogg, supra, n. 15 at 523.

Hogg refers to this head oflegislative power as relating to "the entire body of private law which governs the relationships
between subject and subject, as opposed to the law which governs the relationships between the subject and the
institutions of government," other than in areas that have been explicitly carved out. It covers rules relating to both
"property" and obligations or liability, giving rise to "civil rights". H owever, "[t]he enumerated list of federal heads of
legislative powers ins. 91 included a number of matters which would otherwise have come within property and civil rights
in the province, for example, trade and commerce ..., banking ... , bills of exchange and promissory notes ..., interest ...,
[and] bankruptcy and insolvency .... " Such "federal classes of subjects were withdrawn from property and civil rights by
their exclusive vesting in the federal Parliament." In addition, according to Hogg, "the peace, order and good government
phrase of the opening language of s. 91 presumably contemplated that certain matters which *402 would otherwise have
come within property and civil rights could attain such a national dimension as to come within federal competence." 22
22

Hogg, ibid., at 500 0 1. For the fact that the exercise of a valid federal legislative power may have "the effect of modifying
civil right, in the province, see e.g., Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada, 1894] A.C. 31 at 47, 5 Cart. B.N.A. 244 (Ont. P.C.),
afrd (1892), 190 A.R . I (Ont. C.A.).

Indeed, as set out in Sections 4 and 7 below, in relation to the direct holding of securities, legislative power with respect to
property and civil rights may be superseded by other legislative powers. Particularly, this applies to powers with regard
to companies, and bills of exchange and promissory notes. Accordingly, liability of a corporate share issuer, namely,
its relationship with the security holder (as opposed to the property right of the security holder), as well as liability
on a security which is a bill or note, are not matters of "property and civil rights." The federal legislative power in
relation to bills and notes also supersedes provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights in relation to the transfer,
namely, property aspects, of directly held securities in the form of bills of exchange or promissory notes. With regard
to the indirect holding system, the picture is, however, more monolithic. On its part, the security entitlement is not only
a sui generis form of property, or right in rem. It further creates bundles of obligatory rights, embodied in a unique
in personam relationship between the entitlement holder and the securities intermediary. 23 As will be seen below, in
contrast to the position regarding the direct holding of securities, both the proprietary and obligatory elements of the
security entitlement are, in effect, beyond the reach of other sources of legislative powers and thus entirely remain a
matter of "property and civil rights."
23

See USTA Consultation Paper, supra, n. I at 59 and UCC Revised Article 8, Prefatory Note II. Brief Overview of Revised
Article 8 C. Indirect Holding System.

More generally, the law that governs commercial transactions falls in to provincial jurisdiction relating to property and
civil rights, unless a specific federal power (such as in relation to interest or bills of exchange and promissory notes)
derogates from this broad provincial jurisdiction. It seems, though, tha t "the peace, order and good government" general
power is inappropriate for a basic commercial law matter. 24 Accordingly, *403 in relation to the holding and transfer
of securities and security entitlements, namely, in both the direct and indirect holding systems, the focus of the discussion
shifts to the examination of specific heads of legislative powers, particularly federal, 25 that might supersede the general
provincial competence over property and civil rights.
24

Indeed, the example provided by Hogg for a provincial "property and civil rights subject matter transformed into a federal
one by virtue of "the peace, order, and good government phrase is that of the zoning of the national capital region. See also
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discussion on the " national concern branch of the phrase, Hogg, sup ra, n. 15 at 423 34. Obviously, the "emergency branch,
discussed ibid. , at 434 44, is irrelevant.
25

Competing provincial heads of legislative powers will be addressed only insofar as the discussion may shed light on a related
federal head of legislative power, as for example, immediately below, in relation to companies. Otherwise, the existence of a
provincial legislative power parallel to that relating to property and civil rights is of no practical significance.

4. INCORPORATION OF COMPANIES AND BANKING
The subject of holding and transfer of securities is not a matter in relation to the incorporation of companies with
provincial objects under s. 92(11) of the Constitution Act, 1867. This provision is thus not the source of provincial
jurisdiction relating to the holding and transfer of securities.
With regard to corporate securities, three distinct areas of laws exist. First, company (or corporation) law governs the
issuing of corporate securities and the relationship between a security holder and the issuing company. For any given
security, this law is broad enough to define and cover the nature of the security, namely, the entire scope of rights in
the security, including any transfer restrictions attached to it. Second, securities regulatory law provides for the rules
that govern the distribution and trading of securities, or more genera lly, the operation of securities markets. 26 Third,
securities holding and transfer law deals with the proprietary and obligatory matters relating to the holding and transfer
of securities and security entitlements. It defines the proprietary rights with respect to securities and security entitlements
and provides for mechanisms of transfer for such rights. 27 In effect, with respect to *404 corporate securities, the law
governing the third area provides for the property in, and transfer of, rights in what has been defined as part of the
regulation under the first area, namely, under corporate law.

26

The distinction between the first and second areas is highlighted alon g such lines by J.A. VanD uzer, The Law of Partnerships
and Corporations (Concord, Ont.: Irwin Law, 1997) at 85 87. It is no teworthy that not only does the author not highlight the
distinct nature of the third area, that of securities holding and transfer, he does not discuss it either, thereby lending support
to the proposition that it does not belong to companies law, the subject matter of his book .

27

See e.g., E .T. Spink, "Can the Law Catch up to Securities Market Practices? Verdun v. Toronto Dominion Bank (1996 97)
12 B.F.L.R . 439 at 447.

The power to incorporate companies was understood to coincide with "what is generally classified as company law." 28
With regard to corporate securities, this power covers the first area, but does not go beyond it. Even provincial legislation
governing securities regulation is regarded as "a matter within property and civil rights in the province," 29 and not as
a matter of company law, under the incorporation of companies heading. Accordingly, the third field, that of securities
transfer law, remains a matter of "property and civil rights." The asser tion by the Dickerson Report of 1971 that security
transfer rules are "an integral, even an essential part, of any corporation law" 30 is thus unfortunate. To a large extent,
this observation has been the source of the current confusion. It is inaccurate and ought to be rejected. 3

28

Jacob S. Ziegel, "Constitutional Aspects of Canadian Companies in Studies in Canadian Company Law, Jacob S. Ziegel (ed.)
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1967) Vol. I, 149 at 158.

29

H ogg, supra, n . 15 at 521.

30

R . D ickerson, et al. , Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law in Canada (Ouawa: M inister of Supply Services, 197 1)
Vol. I at 54, para. 169.

31

At present, the matter is dealt neither in the United Kingdom nor in the United States as part of legislation governing
companies. Arguably, the Dickerson Report was concerned more with introducing the subject matter into Canadian legislation
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than in laying out a well thought out, carefully planned, constitutional design for its introduction. See in particular Spink,
supra, n. 27 at 458 (footnote 66). In any event, the fundamental issue here is not in which statute the matter is included, but
rather, under what legislative power it is legislated.

By parity of reasoning, the holding and transfer of securities is not a matter in relation to the incorporation of companies
"for objects other than provincial objects," which falls within exclusive federal jurisdiction. 32 Even if this power
"authorizes some degree of regulation of trading in ... securities" issued by federally incorporated companies, 33 *405
there is no basis for extending it beyond the area of securities regulation. But even within the securities regulation
area, this federal power is stated to exist only to "some degree". 34 Whether support for such federal power has been
diminished, 35 or rekindled, 36 is irrelevant to the discussion on a commercial law dealing with transfer and holding
rules applicable to securities and interests in securities. True, "the manner in which shares [of federally incorporated
companies] can be transferred and acquired" was stated to fall within the federal power of incorporation, as "necessarily
incidental" to it. 37 Nevertheless, this statement was acknowledged to apply in the context of the conditions under which
a person may become, or lose his or her position as, a shareholder in a company. 38 This matter is concerned with
the position of the shareholder towards the company, and is anyway covered by traditional company law, namely, the
first distinct area of the law governing corporate securities, set out above; it is not a matter of securities holding and
transfer law. Accordingly, the holding and transfer of securities does not fall under federal jurisdiction even in relation
to securities issued by issuers incorporated under federal law.
32

See Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parson (1881), 7 A.C. 96, construing the federal residuary power to fill in gaps as a matter of
"Peace, Order, and Good Government of Canada under the opening words of s. 91 of the Constitution Act, I 867.

33

Hogg, supra, n. 15 at 522. The leading case is Multiple Access v. M cCutcheon, 1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, 1982 CarswellOnt 128, 1982
CarswellOnt 738, 138 D.L.R. (3d) I, 44 N.R. 181, 18 B.L.R . 138 (S.C.C.). See also Spink, supra, n. 27 at 448 56, and Chapter
4 ofW.D. Gray & C.W. Halladay, Guide to CECA Reform: Analysis and Precedents (Toronto: Carswell, 2002).

34

Ibid.

35

See text and n. 10, supra.

36

See Wise Persons' Committee to Review the Structure of Securities Regulation in Canada. It s Time (Ottawa: Department
of Finance, December 2003) (Chair: M.E.J. Phelps); online:<http://www.wiseaverties.ca/reports/WPC% 20Final.pdf> (date
accessed: December 18, 2003).

37

The statement is by J.A. Laidlaw in Re International Petroleum (1962), (subnom. Esso Standard (Inter America) Inc. v. J. W
Enterprises Inc.) 33 D .L.R. (2d) 658 at 665, 1962] O.R . 705, 1962 CarswellOnt 187 (Ont.C.A.), affd 1963] S.C.R . 144, 1963
CarswellOnt 60, 37 D.L.R. (2d) 598 (S.C.C.) Esso Standard]. This statement was endorsed by Judson J. at 152. See also
Multiple Access, supra, n. 33 at 179 per Dickson J.

38

Esso Standard, ibid., at 153 (per Judson J.).

Similarly, the holding and transfer of securities issued by banks is not a matter of "banking, incorporation of banks,
and the issue of paper money," in relation to which the federal Parliament is assigned the exclusive legislative power
under s. 9 1(15) of the Constitution A ct, 1867. Obviously, securities holding and transfer is not a matter relating to the
"issue of paper money." As well, as indicated above, securities holding and transfer is not a matter of "incorporation."
At the same time, "banking" *406 relates to business powers of banks, 39 so that in theory, the federal Parliament may
legislate in relation to securities holding and transfers by banks, as this would be legislation in relation to a business power
of banks. 40 This, however, will cover activities of banks in holding or disposing of assets owned by banks, including
securities, and not the activities of others in holding and disposing of securities issued by banks.
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39

See Tennant, supra, n. 22. Note however BeetzJ.'s remark, based on an Australian precedent, in Canadian Pioneer Management
Ltd v. Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan (1979), 1980] 3 W.W.R. 214 at 240 41, 1979 CarswellSask 159, 1979
CarswellSask 163, 1980] l S.C.R. 433, 31 N.R. 361, 2 Sask. R. 217, 107 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), under which the legislative
power relating to banking, "might very well be wider than the concept of banking as a business, and include "matters that]
affect the conduct and control of the business of banking]. With respect, this seems to read into banking matters that are part
of company law thus falling into federal jurisdiction under the subheading of "incorporation of banks and not "banking. For
highlighting federal legislative power over banking as "a functional jurisdiction over a particular type of activity, as opposed
to the institutional jurisdiction over the incorporation of banks, a distinction the present analysis is in full agreement with,
see Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, 2003 ABQB 254, 2003 CarswelJAlta 377, 46 C.C.L.I. (3d) 274 (Alta. Master).

40

Obviously, this does not suggest that banks' power to hold and transfer securities turns securities holding and transfer into
"banking. For a similar analysis in connection with the promotion of insurance products by banks, see Canadian Western
Bank, ibid.

Regardless of the above, singling out and excluding holding and transfers of securities issued by banks and other federally
incorporated companies, whether or not they are regulated financia l institutions, from the general commercial law of
securities holding and transfers, to be provided under the provincial legislative power in relation to property and civil
rights, will only add a confusing and unnecessary layer of complexit y. It is thus strongly urged that even if the federal
incorporation power with respect to companies and banks is taken to be broader than u nder the preceding analysis, the
federal government ought not to use it as a basis for passing legislation governing the transfer of securities of federally
incorporated companies and banks. Indeed, the current experience iin the area o f securities transfer demonstrates that
duplicating heads of federa l j urisdiction, such as between the incorporation and bills of exchange powers, invites
conflicting legislation whose inconsistencies are not easily determinable. 4 Particularly, transfer rules based on *407
the federal incorporation powers invite the proliferation of transfer rules based on any incorporation power, whether
provincial or foreign. T his is undoubtedly a prescription for d isharmonization. F urthermore, linking transfer rules to
those of the j urisdiction of incorporation, rather than to those of the place of the transaction, is contrary to the reasonable
expectations of an investor acquiring securities in a given financial m arket.

41

See discussion in B. Crawford, Payment, Clearing and Settlement in Canada (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2002) Vol. II at
968 70, 1264 65.

T here is further policy su pport for the conclusion that the area of securities holding and transfers is a matter for
property and civil rights and not the incorporation of either provincial or federal companies (as well as banks). Indeed,
besides corporate securities, there are securities issued by public issuers such as government, as well as by non-corporate
private issuers, such as various types of trusts. Government and non-corporate securities are not governed at all by
legislation passed under a power relating to the incorporation of companies. At the same time, there are no grounds for
distinguishing between the law governing the transfer of corporate securities on one hand and non-corporate securities
on the other hand. Uniformity, harmonization, and efficiency thus su pport the inclusion of the securities transfer field
in one legislative jurisdiction as well as under one head of legislative powers. In the context of the division of legislative
powers in Canada, this power resides in the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.
5. MISCELLANEOUS: WORKS TO THE ADVANTAGE O F PROVINCES, TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
INTEREST
T hese are three distinct headings offedera l power, which are lumped t,ogether in one section of the article for convenience
only.
Securities transfer legislation cannot be made to be in relation to " [ s ]uch Works as, although wholly situate within the
Province, are before or after their Execution declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the general Advantage of
Canada or for the advantage of Two or more ofthe Provinces," which fall within federal legislative power under s. 92(1O)(c)
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(in conjunction with s. 91(29)) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The simplest reason for the inapplicability of this legislative
power even to transfers "wholly situate within the Province" is that "work is a tangible thing," 42 which will not cover
the transfer of securities. *408 T ransfers not "wholly situate within the Province" fall outside this heading under the
plain language of the subsection.
42

See Hogg, supra, n. 15 at 542.

An exclusive federal legislative power exists in relation to "The Regulation of Trade and Commerce" under s. 91(2) of
the Constitution Act, 1867. It was held that this encompasses "[1] political arrangements in regard to trade requiring the
sanction of Parliament, [2] regulation of trade in matters o f inter-provincial concerns, and [3] ... general regulation of
trade affecting the whole dominion." 43 Among these headings, the first is irrelevant for securities transfer legislation.
The second heading, to the extent that it requires the securities transferred to cross provincial borders, may not be
44

In the indirect
easily applied, as the determination of the location, or situs, of securities is often controversia l.
holding context, namely, that of security entitlements, location may be required to be determined not in relation to
45

Accordingly, neither
the underlying financial assets themselves, but rather in relation to the securities intermediary.
the characterization of a given securities transfer as interprovincial. nor the identification of the particular provinces
invo lved, is necessarily an easy process with predictable results. In any event, strictly speaking, security entitlements are
not "traded" at all, neither in one province nor between two of them; rather, each transaction generates a corresponding
debit and credit, thereby extinguishing one securities entitlement and creating a new and distinct one. Regardless, it is
unlikely to be beneficia l to regulate interprovincial securities transactions separately from intraprovincial ones.
43

Citizens Insurance Co. , supra. n. 32 at 113.

44

See e.g. , Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust ( No. 3) (1995), 1996] l All E.R. 585 (Eng. C.A.).

45

For a comprehensive discussion, see C. Bernasconi, "The Law Applicable to the Disposition of Securities Held through
Indirect Holding Systems. Preliminary Document No. I of November 2000, Hague Conference on Private International
Law; and B. Crawford, "The Hague "PRIMA Convention: Choice ,o f Law to Govern Recognition of Dispositions of Book
Based Securities in Cross Border Transactions (2003), 38 Can. Bus. L. J 157. "PRIMA is an acronym standing for "place
of the relevant intermediary approach.

With respect to the third heading permitting the federal regulation of intraprovincial trade, it was held that its application
requires certain conditions to be met. They include, among others, the existence under the legislation of a general
regulatory scheme as well as the oversight *409 of a regulatory agency. M ore to the point, " legislation should be of a
nature that the provinces jointly and severally would be constitutionally incapable of enacting. " 46 Such conditions are
not met in connection with securities transfer legislation.
46

General Motors v. City National Leasing, 1989] l SCR 641 at 661, 1989 CarswellOnt 956, 1989 CarswellOnt 125, 1989] S.C.J.
No. 28, 93 N.R. 326, 58 D .L.R. (4th) 255, 32 O.A.C. 332, 43 B.L.R. 225, 24 C.P.R. (3d) 417, 68 O.R . (2d) 512 (note) (S.C.C.).

In the final analysis, and more in general, traditionally, the trade and commerce power has not been used to legislate in
what jurisprudentially is commercial law governing the transfer of property. Whether the federal trade and commerce
power could be understood to cover also intraprovincial securities transactions on the basis that the security industry
serves a capital market which is both interprovincial and international, is specifically left open by Hogg. 47 Nevertheless,
even if the question is to be answered in the affirmative, the application of such power to purely commercial law matters is
unfounded, and as demonstrated, contrary to existing jurisprudence. H ogg's discussion is limited to the field of securities
regulation, which is quite distinct and separate from the area o f securities ho lding and transfers, and his observations
and conclusions ought to remain in their original context.
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47

Hogg, supra, n. 15 at 522.

Finally, in this part of the discussion, s. 91(19) of the Constitution A ct, 1867, assigns to the federal Parliament an exclusive
legislative power with respect to "Interest." Yet, "[t]he interest power may be used to control interest rates, but not to
control other terms of loans." 48 Stated otherwise, the power is not broad enough to legislate in relation to the holding
and transfer of interest-bearing instruments. Again, this result is defensible, since otherwise, laws passed by different
legislative levels would have provided for the holding and transfer of debt and equity instruments.

48

Ibid. , at 507, citing Ontario (Attorney General) v. Barfried Enterprises Ltd., 1963] S.C.R . 570, 1963 CarswellOnt 68, 42 D.L.R.
(2d) 137 (S.C.C.).

6. THE PUBLIC DEBT

There is little doubt that the federal legislative power over " [t]he Public Debt and Property" under s. 91(1A) of the
Constitution Act, 1867, is broad enough to cover the creation of debt instruments embodying *410 the public debt.
However, it does not necessarily follow that the legislative power to provide for the nature of the liability on the
instrument reflecting the public debt is a matter of s. 91(1A). Rather, it is more likely that liability on the debt instrument,
created under s. 91(1A), is a matter of "property and civil rights" discussed above, 49 unless the instruments are in the
form of bills of exchange or promissory notes, in which case, they are legislated under the federal legislative power relating
to "bills of exchange and promissory notes" discussed below. By parity of reasoning, it is doubtful whether a statute
governing the holding and transfer of public debt instruments is in relation to the public debt. R ather, unless it is in the
form of a bill of exchange or promissory note, the pith and substance of such a statute is property and civil rights, a
matter which falls within provincial jurisdiction.

49

For the Crown liability in contract on the common law of the province, see P.W. Hogg & P.J. Monahan, Liability ofthe Crown
(3rd ed.) (Toronto: Carswell, 2000), Chapter 9, particularly at 209 13. See also at 363 69.

Federal provisions dealing with both the liability on, and the holding and transfer of, Government of Canada debt
securities are actually unnecessary for the federal legislative scheme governing the public debt. 50 As well, as a matter of
policy, it is recommended that the federal government will refrain from covering the holding and transfer of government
debt securities, even if it has the power to do so under s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867. This recommendation
follows from the absence of any convincing policy to single out federal government debt instruments for special
treatment, in derogation from the general treatment given to all other securities under general comprehensive uniform
provincial legislation, passed under the property and civil rights power.
50

Query whether such federal rules may be invalid. See General Motors, supra, n. 46 at 668 69.

In this context, some comparison with the position in the United States may be helpful. So far as U.S. law is concerned,
in the view of the drafters of UCC Article 8, "U.S. government securities fall within the definition of security in Article 8
and therefore are governed by Article 8 in the same fashion as any other publicly held debt security." 5 In this sense, the
approach proposed here for Canada follows similar lines. Yet, the drafters of the UCC Article 8 went on to acknowledge
*411 that the application of Article 8 to U.S. government securities may be "preempted by applicable federal law or
regulation." 52 To that end, federal Treasury Regulations exist in the United States to govern, with respect to treasury
securities, both the direct holding system and the upper tier of the indirect holding system for security entitlements. 53
51

Prefatory Note to UCC Article 8, III(C)(2), 1994 Official Text.
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Ibid.

53

31 CFR Part 357 (TRADES and TREASURY DIRECT).

Obviously, both the constitutional and historical backgrounds are unique for each country. But even without taking into
account these factors, so far as the holding and transfer of Government of Canada securities are concerned, the U.S.
situation differs from the Canadian situation in one major respect. In the United States, it is a Federal Reserve Bank,
namely the central bank, which acts as the central securities depository (CSD) for U .S. government securities. Conversely,
the central bank in Canada, the Bank of Canada, plays no CSD role in the indirect holding system for Government of
Canada securities. 54 It provides no separate CSD for Government of Canada debt securities. Rather, they are handled
as part of the same system of indirect holding used for all securities. That is, the CSD role in Canada is performed by CDS
Limited for government as well as corporate and other equity and debt securities. There may be an operational difference
between the handling of non-government and government securities, but not in the fundamental legal relationship of
the CSD in Canada with each type of issuer. To that end, the treatment in the United States of the relationship between
the government as issuer and the central bank as a CSD is quite unique and thus may be inappropriate as a model to
be followed in Canada.
54

However, under the PCSA the Bank of Canada does play an important role as a regulator of"clearing and settlement systems
that have the potential to pose a systemic risk to Canada's financial system.

Regardless, it ought to be noted that U.S. Treasury Regulations govern only the position of the U.S. government towards
its immediate party, the security holder in the direct holding system, and the Federal Reserve Bank, as the CSD, in the
indirect holding system. These Treasury Regulations aim at being harmonious with Article 8. For the indirect holding
system, they presuppose that all lower tiers, namely each relationship other than that with either the government or the
Federal Reserve *412 Bank, are governed by UCC Article 8. The latter is incorporated by reference into the Treasury
Regulations as state law, even where it was not adopted by the state in question, so as to become, for the purpose of the
Treasury Regulations, part of federal law. 55
55

Ibid. §357.11. It should be noted that all 50 U.S. states have since uniformly adopted UCC Revised Article 8.

By parity of reasoning, it is not contested here that the position of the Government of Canada as issuer towards an
immediate party, such as the security holder in the direct holding system and the CSD in the indirect holding system,
may be provided by regulations. 56 Such regulations are to be made consistent with USTA, and following the U.S.
Treasury Regulations, may possibly incorporate USTA by reference, for a province that has not adopted it. In a sense,
such regulations are analogous to rules issued by a corporate issuer regarding the holding of its own securities on its
books, by either a direct securities holder or a CSD. Naturally, unlike the situation in connection with corporate rules,
the possibility of preemption by any federal regulations could be considered, but only in connection with specific rules
that are individually determined to be inappropriate. 57 In the final analysis, this type of determination is outside the
present investigation. For our purposes, one should not lose sight of t he fact that no separate federal statute governs the
indirect holding system in the United States for security entitlements to U.S. government securities.
56

Such Regulations could be issued under Financial Administration Act (Canada), R.S.C. 1985, c. F 11, s. 1, as an enhancement
of Domestic Bonds of Canada Regulations, C.R.C., c. 698.

57

For the indirect holding system, the Trade Commentary (Appendix B to Part 357, Section 357.10) identifies two types of
Article 8 rules as inappropriate for the U.S. Government and Federal Reserve Banks. The first type is with respect to the
issuer's obligations. The second type is with respect to the position of the U.S. Government and Federal Reserve Banks towards
lower tier holders of securities entitlements.
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7. JURISDICTION IN RELATION TO BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES- DIRECT
HOLDING
Under s. 91(18) of the Constitution A ct, 1867, the exclusive legislative power of the Parliament of Canada extends to
matters coming within "Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes." With respect to these types of instruments, provincial
legislative authority in relation to "property *413 and civil rights" is thus superseded. Accordingly, an exception to the
exclusive provincial jurisdiction over securities holding and transfers exists with regard to securities which are either bills
of exchange or promissory notes.
Exercising the legislative power conferred by s. 91(18), the federal Pa rliament passed the Bills of Exchange Act (BEA).
Thereunder, a bill of exchange ("bill") is "an unconditional order in writing, addressed by one person to another, signed
by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable
future time, a sum certain in money or to the order of a specified person or to bearer" (s. 16(1)). A promissory note
(" note") is "an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another, signed by the maker, engaging to pay,
on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money, to, or to the order of, a specified person or
to bearer" (s. 176(1)). A certificated debt security may comply with the formal requirements of a bill or note governed by
the BEA. It follows that the direct holding and transfer system of certificated securities that are either " bills" or "notes"
is governed by the BEA.
There is, however, little doubt that in passing the BEA the federal Parliament did not exhaust its legislative power under
s. 91(18) of the Constitution A ct; federal statutes other than the BEA may govern bills and notes. Moreover, such a federal
statute may supersede the BEA. In fact, instruments complying with the definitions of bills or notes under the BEA but
nevertheless governed by a federal statute that supersedes the BEA may be securities, whose direct holding and transfer
system is thus governed by that other federal statute. This has been a source of overlaps and unnecessary uncertainty as
well as inconsistency. Particular overlaps have been noted between the BEA and CBCA. 58 To preclude a result under
which negotiable debt securities issued by federally incorporated companies are governed by a different law than the
one governing negotiable debt securities issued by provincially incorporated companies, namely, the BEA, Crawford
sensibly proposed originally to assign priority to the BEA. 59 Under his view, negotiable debt securities, *414 issued
by both federally and provincially incorporated corporations, were to be governed by the BEA. However, subsequent
amendments to federal statutes governing financial institutions, including the Bank A ct, 60 specifically made transfer
provisions of each such statute applicable to negotiable instruments issued by the relevant financial institution, including
banks. Such statutes contain express provisions superseding the BEA, 6 so that as a matter of statutory interpretation,
their applicability, over the provisions of the BEA, to securities in t he form of bills and notes issued by each type of
institution cannot be disputed. While relevant provisions in the various statutes that govern financial institutions are
fairly uniform, diversity of legislative sources may eventually lead to the loss of uniformity. Uniformity within the federal
domain is anyway undermined by such statutes due to existing variance between them and the BEA.
58

Canada Business Corporations A ct, supra, n. 7, s. 48(3).

59

See discussion in B. Crawford, Crawford and Falconhridge Banking and Bills of Exchange (8th ed.) (Toronto: Canada Law
Book, 1986) Vol. II at 1223 25. For Crawford present position see cites inn. 41, supra.

60

Bank Act, supra, n. 8, s. 81 , definition of "security. See also, Insurance Companies A ct, supra, n. 8, s. 85; Trust and Loan
Companies Act, supra, n. 8, s. 84; and Cooperative Credit Associations Act, supra, n. 8, s. 88.

61

See Bank Act, ibid., s. 83(1); Trust and Loan Companies Act, ihid.., s. 86(1); Insurance Companies Act, ibid. , s. 87(1) and
Cooperative Credit Associations A ct, ibid., s. 90(1).
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With regard to federa lly incorporated companies, other than those governed by financial institutions legislation, it
is therefore difficult now to invoke lack of uniformity with provincially incorporated companies as a rationalization
for regarding the CBCA as necessarily superseded by the BEA. T his is so notwithstanding the fact that the CBCA is
itself not stated to supersede the BEA. 62 Simply stated, the fact that at least some securities in the form of bills and
notes, namely, those issued by federally incorporated financial institu tions, are not governed by the BEA, may have farreaching implications. This fact strongly undermines the position that for uniformity's sake, the application of the BEA
to securities in the form of bills and notes issued by provincially incorporated *415 companies justifies the application of
the BEA also to securities in the form of bills and notes issued by federally incorporated companies other than regulated
financial institutions. From this perspective, it is open to argue now t hat the CBCA supersedes the BEA with respect to
such securities issued by federa lly incorporated companies other than regulated financial institutions. Arguably, a ll these
duplications, overlaps, and ensuing uncertainties have been more accidental than intentional. They are nevertheless a
source of confusion and uncertainty.
62

Overlaps between the BEA and other federal statutes governing bilJs and notes that are securities are criticaJJy reviewed in
writings in Alberta Law Reform Institute, supra, n. 5 at 154 58, which recommend, in the footsteps of Crawford's original
position, supra, n. 59, that any such overlaps are to be eliminated so as to bring about clarity. The unnecessary duplication
partly reflects the position, specifically disfavoured above in Section 4, Incorporation of Companies and Banking, that
securities holding and transfers laws may be passed under federal legislative powers relating to the incorporation of companies
and banking.

A security which is neither bill nor note will be governed by valid provincial security transfer legislation. Whether a given
security is a bill or note under existing federal law depends on its compliance with the statutory definition under either s.
16(1) (for a bill) or s. 176(1) (for a note) of the BEA. In many cases the determination of this issue is not easy, particularly
with regard to the statutory requirement that the order (in the case of a bill) or promise (in the case of a note) must be
"unconditional." 63 T here is the additional question whether government debt securities are covered by the BEA, even
when they comply with the formal requirements. T his latter question arises in light of s. 17 of the Interpretation Act,
providing that no enactment binds the Crown "except as mentioned or referred to in the enactment." 64 No specific

language to that effect appears in the BEA. 65
63

For example, " t]reasury bills and notes generaJJy provide on their face that they are payable out of the issuing government's
consolidated general revenue fund. See Alberta Law Reform Institute, ihid. at 164. This appears to exclude them from the
BEA that provides, in s. 16(3), that an order to pay out of a particular fund "is not unconditional . An order on a bill of
exchange must be "unconditional . See BEA s. 16(1).

64

Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 21 , s. 17.

65

For a comprehensive discussion, see Alberta Law Reform Institute, supra, n. 4 at 158 72.

Both existing duplication among federal statutes and uncertainty as to whether a security is a bill or note are harmful
and detrimental to market certainty. Undoubtedly, the federal Parliament may eliminate duplication by specifically
identifying the BEA as governing aHsecurities that are bills o r notes. At the same time, the power of the federal Parliament
to define bills and notes so as to bring the defined instruments into the field reserved for federal jurisdiction under s.
91(18) of the Constitution Act has not been clarified. T here is, however, little doubt *416 that such power exists in
relation to instruments circulating in financial markets that bear resemblance to the "historical" bills and notes whose
66

law has been codified in bills of exchange legislation. To that end, there is also little doubt that federal jurisdiction
under s. 91(18) of the Constitution Act, 1867, is broad enough to facilitate the amendment of the BEA with a view to
expanding and clarifying its scope with regard to borderline cases. T his could be done, for example, by refining and better
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defining the requirements for an " unconditional" order or promise, as well as by making the BEA specifically apply to
the Crown. Under such circumstances, most borderline bill and note cases can be brought into federal jurisdiction.
66

For a comprehensive historical account leading to codification, see J.M. Holden, The History of Negotiable Instruments in
English Law (London: Athlone Press, 1955).

However, using the BEA as the one statute to govern direct holding and transfer of securities that are bills or notes may
not be the optimal solution. 67 First, not all rules applicable to bills and notes in general are appropriate for bills and
notes that are securities. This is recognized in the United States where, under the UCC, and even in the absence of any
constitutional consideration, securities in the form of bills or notes are governed by Article 8 (covering securities) and
not Article 3 (covering bills and notes in general). See UCC §§ 3-102 and 8-103(d). The rationale for excluding securities
in the form of bills and notes from the statute governing bills and notes in general is outlined in Official Comment 2 to
UCC §3-102. The Comment sets out a few rules applicable to bills and notes other than securities, such as the liability of
an endorser and the discharge of the obligation to the holder rather t han the registered owner. A second reason against
designating the BEA as the one statute that governs direct holding and transfers of securities that are bills or notes is
that any federal statute governing securities in the form of bills and notes may still give rise to duplication between the
provincial and federal securities transfer statutes. Like any other duplication, this could be harmful.
67

In fact, the current treatment of the subject in other federal statutes, as indicated in text at n. 59 61 supra, is an
acknowledgement to that effect, except that as indicated, the specific solution that had been adopted brought it further
confusion and uncertainties.

*417 Accordingly, the most appropriate approach to the regulation of the direct holding and transfer of securities in the

form of bills or notes is the specific exclusion of "securities" from the definitions of " bills of exchange" and "promissory
note" under the federal BEA. This ought to be undertaken without the corresponding enactment of a federal statute
applicable to securities that are bills or notes. This course of action will amount to the voluntary withdrawal oflegislative
powers by the federal Parliament in relation to securities that would have been bills or notes. It will have the effect of
leaving the provincial "property and civil rights" legislative power unchallenged by the federal " bills of exchange and
promissory notes" legislative power, which would have superseded it. Securities that would otherwise be governed by a
federal statute would thus be left covered by the uniform provincial statute applying to securities holding and transfer
in general. In the absence of any inconsistent federal statute, the general law provisions will not be superseded.
One advantage of this strategy is that it would bring the Canadian legislative approach even closer to that of its American
counterpart. As under the UCC, there will be one statute dealing with bills and notes that are not securities, and another
statute to govern securities, including those that are in the form of bills and notes. It is noteworthy in this context
that, in their quest for a modern, efficient, and rational commercial law framework governing securities holding and
transfers, and irrespective of any constitutional considerations, the Americans concluded that all provisions regarding
the transfer of securities, including those that are bills of exchange or promissory notes, are to be included in one statute
that will supersede the general one dealing with bills and notes. As demonstrated by the preceding analysis, subject to
federal cooperation, there are no constitutional barriers to reaching the same result in Canada. The only difference with
the United States will be that in Canada, the bills and notes statute not governing securities will remain federal. This
is inevitable under the Canadian constitutional division of legislative powers, and immaterial for the purpose of the
present discussion. At least in relation to the direct holding system, one uniform statute governing securities holding and
transfers, passed by each province and territory, will be all-inclusive in terms of types and form of securities covered.
*418 If this approach is regarded as too bold, the alternative is to pass a federal-specific statute, covering securities
in the form of biils and notes, whether government or other debt instruments. As indicated, due to specific features of
securities that are bills and notes that distinguish them from bills and notes in general, this is a better approach than
the one premised on an amendment of the BEA. As indicated, the passage of the BEA has not exhausted legislative
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powers under s. 91(18) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Furthermore, covering all securities that are bills and notes, and
specifically excluding them from the BEA, the proposed Act will not be a source of unproductive or harmful duplication
on the federal level. The proposed Act will govern securities that are bills or notes. Its definitions will be made to clearly
accommodate borderline cases, as previously proposed with respect to amendments to the BEA. The proposed Act will
take into account the specific features of such securities as bills and notes but otherwise be harmonized with the provincial
UST A. In a sense, on the federal level in Canada, this approach will follow the treatment of the matter in the United
States, where securities that are bills and notes are not governed by the general law of bills and notes. Nevertheless,
as indicated, this approach will result in an unnecessary duplication between provincial and federal jurisdiction and is
therefore recommended only if the proposal to voluntarily decline federal jurisdiction is not accepted. 68
68

As stated earlier, the federal government's refusal to withdraw from tihis area would be justified ifthe provinces and territories
were unable to implement the UST A uniformly.

8. JURISDICTION IN RELATION TO BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES- INDIRECT
HOLDING
While certificated securities that are bills or notes are subject to federal legislative power, rights and obligations in
the indirect holding system remain under provincial legislative jurisdiction, even in relation to security entitlements to
financial assets consisting of bills and notes. This is so even if the federal Parliament does not follow the suggestion made
above in Section 7 and does not exempt the instruments themselves (namely, securities that are bills or notes) from the
scope of federal legislation.
*419 The reason is that the indirect holding system is not concerned with the underlying financial asset itself, which

may be a certificate in the form of a bill or note falling under federal jurisdiction, but rather with a "security entitlement,"
credited to a securities account maintained by a securities intermediary, and defined in both UCC §8-102(a)(17) and
D raft USTA s. 1(1) as "the rights and property ... with respect to a financialasset." The scope of such "property interest"
is described in UCC §8-503(b), as well as in D raft USTA s. 108(2), to be "a pro rata property interest in all interests in
that financial asset held by the securities intermediary ... " with whom the "entitlement holder" maintains a "securities
account." Consistent with the definition in UCC §8-102(a)(9) as well as in Draft USTA s. 1(1) (as supplemented bys.
5), the "financial asset" may be either a security or security entitlement held by the securities intermediary to back the
security entitlement held by the investor. The investor typically does not have a direct property interest in any underlying
specific security held by the securities intermediary, but rather a claim to the pool of assets backing the investor's security
entitlement.
Even when the financial asset is a bill or note, so as to fall under federal jurisdiction, neither the "pro rata property" in
the instrument, nor the balance of the rights of the entitlement holder towards the securities intermediary, is a matter of
the law of bills and notes "in the strict sense" so as to fall within federal legislative power. This is even more apparent
in the more usual case when the investor's claim is to a pro rata share in a pool of underlying instruments and other
financial assets, rather than any particular instrument. Moreover, whatever is the analogy between the bill or note and
the security entitlement with respect to it as a financial asset, strictly speaking, in the law governing the indirect holding,
there is no transfer of a security entitlement, but rather the extinction of one and the creation of another by means of
a debit and credit posted to respective securities accounts. There is thus no analogy whatsoever between a transaction
involving a bill or note and a transaction concerning a security entitlement.
In general, the law of bills and notes "in the strict sense" covers matters such as the form, issue, negotiation, and discharge
of bills and notes. 69 There is some controversy as to the reach of the federal legislative *420 power to the law of bills
and notes "in the broad sense," namely, to the law governing the proprietary and obligatory features of bills and notes
in matters that would otherwise be governed by the general law of the province under its power to legislate over property
and civil rights. 70 But regardless, at the most, it may be argued that federal legislation with respect to "broad sense"
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matters is valid as ancillary, or necessarily incidental, to "strict sense" legislation on bills and notes. BEA provisions
with regard to transfer other than by negotiation (s. 60(1)), capacity (s. 46), and valuable consideration (s. 52) may fall
into this category. On the other hand, it is submitted here, legislation governing the indirect holding of financial assets
consisting of bills and notes is concerned with the law governing property and other rights of an entitlement holder as
against a securities intermediary in the indirect holding system rather than with the law of bills and notes, so as to be
a matter of property and civil rights, and not of bills of exchange or promissory no tes. As indicated in Section 2 of
this article, insofar as it encroaches upon a field of competence belonging to the other level of government, the " double
aspect" doctrine is to be relied on by either the federal government or t he provinces with extreme caution and restraint. It
is only when the federal and provincial characteristics of a law are roughly equal in importance that it can be concluded
"that laws of that kind may be enacted by either the [federal] Parliament or a [provincial] Legislature." 7 It is submitted
here that in relation to legislation governing the indirect ho lding of financial assets that are bills or notes, that is, security
entitlements to financial assets consisting of bills and notes, the "federal characteristics," namely, the " bills of exchange
and promissory notes" aspect, is weaker than the "provincial features," namely, the "property and civil rights" aspect.
T he latter is thus to supersede the former.
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See for example R ed River Forest Products Inc. v. Ferguson (1992), 1993] 2 W.W.R. 1, 1992 CarswellMan 149, 83 Man. R .
(2d) 27, 36 W.A.C. 27, 98 D.L.R. (4th) 697, 8 C.P.C. (3d) 328n (Man.C.A.), and references cited there, including B. Geva,
"Preservation of Consumer Defences: Statutes and Jurisdiction (1982) 32 U.T.L.J. 176.
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For the view, based on a historical approach, that the exclusive jurisdiction given to the federal Parliament in relation to bills
and notes was confined to the law of bills and notes in the strict sense, see J. Leclair, " La Constitution par l'histoire: portee
et etendue de la competence federale exclusive en matiere de lettres de change et de billets a ordre (1992), 33 Les Cahiers
de Droit 535.

71

Hogg, supra, n. 15 at 361 , relying on Lederman, supra, n. 19 at 244, and citing case law adopting this approach.

*421 At present, the indirect holding and transfer of financial assets that are bills and notes within securities accounts
72

maintained by C DS Limited is governed in Canada by the federal D epository Bills and N otes Act (DBNA). Crawford
states that the DBNA "was created to deal with the problems of e lectro nic delivery" of bills and notes and that, to
that end, it "creates a new class of investment securities designed to be traded and delivered by means of screen-based
systems." 73 Viewed as bills or notes, such instruments fall within the ambit of exclusive federal legislative p ower under
s. 91(18) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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Depository Bills and Notes Act, S.C. 1998, c. 13. The DBNA uses the same fictional deemed delivery and possession concepts
ass. 85 of the OBCA, such that a transaction related to a "depository bill or "depository note effected by way of an entry
on the books of CDS Limited has the same effect as a delivery of a bill of exchange in bearer form under the BEA. The USTA
Consultation Paper discusses the problems with this concept and the D BNA in general. See UST A Consultation Paper, supra,
n. I at41 45.
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B. Crawford, "The Depository Bills and Notes Act: Negotiable Instruments for the Electronic Age (1998 99) 14 B.F.L.R.
205 at 232, 206.

No netheless, in conclusion, C rawford acknowledges that the DBNA " is unlikely to be of significant long-term influence,
since it em ploys a flawed, but expedient, concept of deemed physical delivery that will probably become fully obsolete
74
within a very few years."
T his will occur upon the introduction of modern securities transfer and holding legislation,
namely, USTA, governing the indirect holding system. As discussed, the focus of the law governing the indirect holding
system is on the bundle of rights that an entitlement ho lder has on the basis of its relationship with its securities
intermediary. Such rights include a "pro rata" property in the pool of financial assets held by the securities intermediary.
T he focus is not on the right to any specific physical instrument, "constructively" delivered from one person to another,
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while physically held by the CSD at the highest tier of the chain in the indirect holding system. It is therefore submitted
here that Crawford's defence of the constitutionality of the DBNA need not be seen as applicable to legislation governing
security entitlements to financial assets that are bills and notes held at all levels of the chain in the indirect holding system.
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Ibid., at 242.

*422 So far, the discussion in this section has assumed that securities in the form of bills and notes are subject to federal
legislative jurisdiction. The discussion has been concerned with the legislative power over the indirect holding system,
that is, with the security entitlements to such financial assets. Obviously, no argument in support of federal jurisdiction
over the indirect holding system for securities issued in the form of bills and notes could effectively be made if the
federal Parliament chooses to follow the suggestion made above in Section 7, and withhold its legislative powers, and not
provide for the inclusion of securities which otherwise would be bills and notes within the scope of federal legislation.
As discussed, in the absence of a federal statute, securities that would be bills and notes are to be left covered by the
general law governing the direct securities holding and transfer of the province. In such a case, the application of general
provincial legislation governing the indirect holding system, discussed in this section, to security entitlements to financial
assets in the form of bills or notes, could not be questioned.
9. CONCLUSION

The conclusion of this article is that the holding and transfer of securities in both the direct and indirect holding systems
is a matter of provincial jurisdiction under the legislative power relating to property and civil rights. It is not a matter
relating to the incorporation of companies, and thus does not fall under the federal jurisdiction in relation to federally
incorporated companies. Equally, it is not a matter subject to federal jurisdiction over banking, local work to the
advantage of more than one province, the regulation of trade and commerce, or interest. On the whole, it is also not
a matter falling within the federal legislative power over the public debt. However, certificated debt securities may be
subject to federal jurisdiction relating to bills of exchange and promissory notes. With respect to such securities, federal
jurisdiction thus extends to the direct holding and transfer system, though not to the indirect holding system.
It is nevertheless recommended that applicable federal legislation should exclude all securities from statutory definitions
of "bills of exchange" and "promissory notes" so as to vacate the field in favour of provincial jurisdiction. This would
provide for a more rational boundary *423 line between the law governing bills and notes and the law governing
securities holding and transfers, and harmonize with the boundary line that currently exists in the United States between
these two bodies of law, namely, UCC Articles 3 and 8. However, this recommendation is made on the assumption that
the USTA is uniformly adopted, and uniformly maintained, by the provinces and territories to a degree achieved by all
50 U.S. states in relation to the UCC.

In the final analysis, stretched to its limit, federal jurisdiction over securities holding and transfers is patched and
segmented. This is not the case for provincial jurisdiction, which can be made to apply to the whole field. The entire area
of securities holding and transfers, in both the direct and indirect system, governed by one piece of commercial legislation
passed by a single jurisdictional level, will eliminate uncertainty, increase efficiency, and result in harmony with the
legislative treatment of the same subject matter in the United States. Provided federal jurisdiction is withdrawn from the
direct holding system of certificated securities which are bills of exchange and promissory notes, comprehensive securities
holding and transfer legislation can be introduced uniformly in Canada exclusively at the provincial level. Assuming such
legislation is uniformly adopted and maintained by all provinces and territories, legal certainty and market efficiencies
will be enhanced, and confusion and inefficiencies will be eliminated in Canada.
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